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Abstract
Although priming of familiar stimuli is usually age invariant, little is known about how aging affects
priming of pre-experimentally unfamiliar stimuli. Therefore, this study investigated the effects of
aging and encoding-to-test delays (0 min, 20 min, 90 min, and 1 week) on priming of unfamiliar
objects in block-based priming paradigms. During the encoding phase, subjects viewed pictures of
novel objects (Experiments 1 and 2) or novel and familiar objects (Experiment 3) and judged their
left/right orientation. In the test block, priming was measured using the possible/impossible object-
decision test (Experiment 1), symmetric/asymmetric object-decision test (Experiment 2), and real/
non-real object-decision test (Experiment 3). In Experiments 1 and 2, young adults showed priming
for unfamiliar objects at all delays, whereas older adults whose baseline task performance was similar
to that of young adults did not show any priming. Experiment 3 found no effects of age or delay on
priming of familiar objects; however, priming of unfamiliar objects was only observed in the young
subjects. This suggests that when older adults cannot rely on pre-existing memory representations,
age-related deficits in priming can emerge.
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It is well known that normal aging is accompanied by a reduction in explicit memory, or the
ability to consciously recall or recognize previously experienced information (Cabeza, Nyberg,
& Park, 2005). In contrast, another type of memory, priming, remains relatively intact in
healthy older adults (D. A. Fleischman, 2007; D.A. Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998; Light, Prull,
La Voie, & Healy, 2000). Priming is a type of implicit memory and refers to a change in
performance (e.g., speed, accuracy, or bias) for a previously encountered stimulus compared
to a new stimulus. Priming can occur in the absence of conscious memory for a stimulus and
Corresponding author mailing address: Yaakov Stern, Ph.D., Taub Institute, P & S Box 16, 630 West 168th Street, New York, NY 10032,
E-mail: E-mail: ys11@columbia.edu, Fax: 212-342-1838.
NIH Public Access
Author Manuscript
Psychol Aging. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2009 May 13.
Published in final edited form as:













is thought to rely on different neural structures than explicit memory (reviewed in Henson,
2003).
Notably, one important theoretical question that has received very little attention in studies of
priming is whether intact priming in older adults relies on the existence of pre-existing memory
representations. Whereas priming for familiar stimuli is largely based on the reactivation of
existing memory representations, priming for novel stimuli has been suggested to be mediated
by newly acquired representations (Bowers, 1994, 1996; Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000;
Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). Of the over 100 studies investigating the effects of aging
on priming, we are aware of only six studies that used pre-experimentally unfamiliar stimuli
(Keane, Wong, & Verfaellie, 2004; Light, Kennison, Prull, LaVoie, & Zuellig, 1996; Light,
La Voie, & Kennison, 1995; Schacter, Cooper, & Valdiserri, 1992; Soldan, Gazes, Hilton, &
Stern, 2008; Wiggs & Martin, 1994) and all but two them (Schacter et al., 1992; Soldan, Gazes
et al., 2008) used verbal material, which may, arguably, draw upon pre-existing semantic,
lexical, or sub-lexical representations.
Interestingly, the evidence to date from studies using verbal material suggests that when
priming of pre-existing semantic, lexical, and sub-lexical representations is minimized by using
illegal non-words (Keane et al., 2004), priming can be obtained for young but not older adults.
In the case of pronounceable non-words, which may involve the re-activation of lexical or sub-
lexical representations, the evidence is more mixed. One study using Turkish words in non-
Turkish speaking subjects also found priming in young but not older adults (Wiggs & Martin,
1994). Another study, by comparison, did not find an effect of age on priming for
pronounceable non-words, although the magnitude of priming in both experiments was
numerically smaller for the older subjects and did not appear to differ from zero in one
experiment (Light et al., 1996, Experiments 1 and 3). Additionally, Light et al. (1995) showed
age invariance in item and associative priming for novel compound words (e.g., “wifetest“ or
“legthing”), where priming likely draws upon existing semantic and conceptual
representations.
In the non-verbal domain, the evidence concerning the effects of aging on priming for
unfamiliar stimuli is also very scant. Although two studies reported comparable levels of
priming for novel three-dimensional (3-D) objects in young and older subjects (Schacter et al.,
1992; Soldan, Gazes et al., 2008), both studies have potentially important limitations. In the
study by Schacter et al. (1992), the older group’s overall task performance was at chance,
making their priming effects difficult to interpret. By comparison, Soldan et al. (2008) used a
short-term priming paradigm with an interleaved series of stimulus presentations and only 2
to 6 items intervening between stimulus repetitions (which corresponds to 9 to 21 sec). It is
unclear whether their results would generalize to a traditional block-based priming paradigm
where different tasks are performed during the encoding and the test phases of the experiment
and where many items intervene between repetitions. Therefore, the primary goal of the current
study was to examine perceptual priming for unfamiliar visual objects in a large sample of
healthy young and older individuals using traditional block-based priming paradigms. Note
that within the context of this study, ‘short-term priming’ refers to effects that are measured in
the order of milliseconds to seconds; ‘long-term priming’ refers to effects measured on the
order of days; and ‘priming’ without any further specification refers to effects in the order of
minutes to hours, as is the case with most traditional block-based priming paradigms.
Investigating whether priming for unfamiliar stimuli remains intact in older individuals is also
of theoretical significance from a neuroscientific perspective because current evidence
suggests that priming for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli may be based on different underlying
neural processes and/or structures (e.g., Fiebach, Gruber, & Supp, 2005; Henson et al., 2000;
Soldan, Zarahn, Hilton, & Stern, 2008). This means that current knowledge regarding the
Soldan et al. Page 2













effects of aging on priming may not generalize from studies using familiar stimuli to studies
using unfamiliar stimuli. Furthermore, if aging differentially affects priming of familiar and
unfamiliar stimuli, it would suggest that the underlying neural processes and/or structures that
mediate priming may be differentially sensitive to age-related deterioration.
A secondary goal of this study was to examine the persistence of priming for unfamiliar objects
over time in young and older adults. Studies using familiar stimuli have demonstrated priming
following extended encoding-to-test delays (e.g., 52 weeks, Beatty, English, & Winn, 1998; 5
years, Kennedy, Rodrigue, & Raz, 2007), but all studies using unfamiliar stimuli tested priming
immediately after the encoding phase. Because newly formed memory representations may be
less stable over time or more susceptible to interference than representations of familiar words
and objects, it is possible that priming for pre-experimentally unfamiliar stimuli deteriorates
and possibly disappears over time. This hypothesis was tested in the present study by assessing
priming for unfamiliar objects at four different delays: subjects were tested for one set of items
encoded immediately before the test phase and for a second set of items encoded either 20 min,
90 min, or 1 week before the test phase. In addition, the present study tested whether priming
in older adults decreases more rapidly over time than in young adults, as has been suggested
by some studies (Kennedy et al., 2007; Wiggs, Weisberg, & Martin, 2006; but see Mitchell,
Brown, & Murphy, 1990 for a similar decrease in young and older subjects).
Like the two prior studies examining priming for unfamiliar objects (Schacter et al., 1992;
Soldan, Gazes et al., 2008), Experiment 1 of this study used the possible/impossible object-
decision test to measure priming. In this test, subjects are asked to decide whether previously
presented and new figures represent structurally possible or impossible 3-D objects (see Figure
1 for examples). Priming in this test has consistently been demonstrated for possible but not
impossible objects (e.g., Schacter et al., 1990). (For a discussion why priming is not typically
seen for impossible objects under standard test conditions, see Ratcliff & McKoon, 1995;
Schacter & Cooper, 1995; Williams & Tarr, 1997). Experiment 2 tested whether the main
findings from Experiment 1 would generalize to a different perceptual priming task using
unfamiliar objects in a symmetric/asymmetric object-decision test. Finally, Experiment 3
directly compared the effect of aging on priming for familiar and unfamiliar objects in a real/
non-real object-decision test.
Experiment 1: Possible / impossible object-decision priming
Several lines of evidence suggest that the possible/impossible object-decision test is truly a test
of implicit rather than explicit memory, making it suitable for exploring age differences in
priming. In particular, single- and double- dissociations between P/I object-decision and old/
new recognition have been observed by manipulating the encoding instructions (e.g., Schacter
et al., 1990), manipulating attention at encoding (e.g., Soldan, Mangels, & Cooper, in press),
or by transforming object properties between encoding and test (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros,
& Moore, 1992). Priming for possible objects has also been observed in amnesic patients whose
explicit memory is impaired (Schacter, Cooper, Tharan, & Rubens, 1991; Schacter, Cooper,
& Treadwell, 1993). Furthermore, priming appears to rely on perceptual, rather than conceptual
processes, as it is most robustly observed with structural encoding tasks that emphasize
processing of the objects’ global structure, but not with elaborative conceptual encoding
instructions that do not encourage structural encoding (Schacter et al., 1990).
Method
Participants—There were 120 young and 80 older participants in this experiment. The young
participants for Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (age range = 18 – 32 years) were drawn from the
student population at Columbia University and received either $10 per hour or partial course
credit for participation. Older participants for all experiments (age range = 61 – 87 years) were
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recruited from local Manhattan Senior Centers and through a local roster of prospective
volunteers and received $15.00 per hour for their time.
Subjects in all experiments reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision and being
free of neurological and psychiatric diseases, as determined via questionnaire. All older
subjects were classified as non-demented and without serious cognitive impairment, based on
their performance on the Dementia Rating Scale-2 (i.e., score of 130 or higher). Subjects were
also administered the Selective Reminding Test, a test of explicit verbal long-term memory;
the North American Adult Reading Test (NART), a measure of verbal IQ; the Controlled Word
Fluency Test (CFL); and the WAIS-III Letter-Number Sequencing test, a measure of working
memory. See Table 1 for a list of participant characteristics.
Stimuli—The stimuli consisted of images of 48 three-dimensionally possible and 48
impossible line-drawn objects (Figure 1). In a pilot study, an additional group of 10 older
participants viewed these stimuli at the experimental test exposure duration of 200 ms and was
asked to classify them as possible or impossible. The resulting time-limited accuracies were
then used to divide the 96 objects into eight different lists of 12 possible and 12 impossible
objects, such that baseline accuracy for both possible and impossible objects was similar across
the eight lists. These object lists were then rotated across the experimental conditions, across
subjects, such that each object appeared equally often in each condition. Note that although
construction of the object lists was based on responses of older participants only, the same lists
and counterbalancing procedure were used for both young and older subjects during the
experiment so that the experimental conditions would be identical for both age groups. The
same approach of constructing stimulus lists was used for Experiments 2 and 3, except that in
Experiment 3, stimuli remained on the screen until a decision was made and the lists were
matched on the basis of RT rather than accuracy. An additional 10 stimuli were selected as
buffer items used at the beginning of each encoding and test block. In all experiments, the
objects fit completely within a circle that subtended 10 degrees of visual angle.
Procedure—The possible / impossible object-decision task consisted of two encoding blocks
and a subsequent test block. Participants viewed distinct sets of objects (12 possible, 12
impossible) in each encoding session. Delay was manipulated by interposing a delay of 20 min,
90 min, or 1 week between the first and second encoding block. The test block immediately
followed the second encoding block, such that all subjects viewed one set of objects
immediately prior to the test block (the immediate condition, second encoding block) and a
different set of objects at a delay (the delayed condition, first encoding block). In both
Experiments 1 and 3, subjects were assigned to a delay condition (20 min, 90 min, or 1 week)
primarily as a function of subject preference. While this manner of assignment is not ideal, we
felt it was a compromise that we had to take in order to minimize the loss of participants over
the 1-week delay period. Importantly, preliminary analysis indicated that there were no
consistent differences in age, education, or any of the neuropsychological variables between
subjects in the delay conditions in any of the three experiments, as determined via two-tailed
t-tests.
In addition, for all experiments, preliminary analyses of variance (ANOVAs), separately for
each age group, were conducted to test if the delay groups differed in object-decision
performance for test items that were identical for the delay groups, i.e., items encoded in the
block immediately preceding the test phase and new test items. These analyses did not reveal
any significant main effects or interactions with delay group, indicating that the delay groups
were indeed equivalent. Each delay group was composed of 40 subjects. Older subjects did
not participate in the 1-week condition because priming was not obtained in the 20-min or 90-
min delay conditions in older adults (see results).
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During each encoding block, the task was to indicate whether each object faced primarily
towards the left or to the right. Although there is no objectively right or wrong answer to this
question, these encoding instructions have been shown to elicit reliable priming of possible
objects (e.g., Schacter et al., 1990). At test, all 48 encoded stimuli (12 immediate possible; 12
immediate impossible; 12 delayed possible; 12 delayed impossible) were intermixed with a
new set of 24 possible and 24 impossible items. Subjects were instructed to indicate whether
each object is three-dimensionally possible or impossible. Subjects were not informed of the
possible/impossible test task in advance.
For subjects in the 90-min and 1 week delay groups, all neuropsychological testing could be
completed in the time interval between the two encoding blocks. Subjects in the 20-min
condition completed part of the neuropsychological assessment during this time window and
the remainder following the test block of the object-decision test.
All encoding and test trials were participant-initiated by a press of the space bar. The encoding
trials began with a fixation point ("+") shown at the center of the screen for 350 ms. Fifty ms
after fixation offset, a single stimulus was presented for 4000 ms, and participants were directed
to carefully examine each object for the entire duration it was on the screen to be able to make
an accurate left/right judgment. Participants entered their left and right responses using their
left and right index fingers, respectively. After responding, participants were prompted for the
subsequent trial. Test trials followed the same general format as the encoding trials except that
the fixation cue was shown for 150 ms, the stimulus was displayed for 200 ms (12 video refresh
cycles) for the older participants, and 33 ms (2 refresh cycles) for the young participants.
Shorter times were used with the young participants to avoid ceiling effects in performance.
In the test block, participants were told to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, but
there was no time limit. The experiment was run on Macintosh computers using Psyscope 1.2.5.
Data Analysis—An α-level of 0.05 was adopted for all analyses. The data were analyzed
using ANOVAs and significant effects were followed up with appropriate post-hoc tests
corrected for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. Analyses involving
independent variables with more than 2 levels were corrected for violations of the sphericity
assumption using the Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values. For interactions between age
and other variables, the effect size statistic generalized eta squared (η2G) is reported, the
recommended measure for repeated measures designs (Bakeman, 2005). The main dependent
variable in this experiment was classification accuracy. Priming was measured as the difference
in classification accuracy for previously encoded objects and new objects.
Results
Mean object-decision accuracy for young and older subjects as a function of delay is shown
in Figure 2. In order to evaluate the persistence of priming over delays, separate ANOVAs
were initially performed for young and older subjects, with object type (possible vs. impossible)
and encoding status (encoded immediate vs. encoded delayed vs. new) as within subject factors
and delay group (20 min vs. 90 min for the older adults and 20 min vs. 90 min vs. 1 week for
the young adults) as a between subjects factor.
For the young subjects, there was a main effect of encoding status [F(2, 234) = 11.88, p <
0.0001] and an interaction between encoding status and object type [F(2, 234 = 10.25, p <
0.0001]. Separate ANOVAs for possible and impossible objects produced no reliable effects
for impossible objects [all p > 0.34]. For possible objects, there was a main effect of encoding
status [F(2, 234) = 23.82, p < 0.0001], but the effect of delay group did not reach significance
[F(2, 117] = 1.57, p = 0.21]. Post-hoc helmert contrasts indicated that accuracy was
significantly higher for encoded objects (immediate and delayed) than for new objects [F(1,
117) = 50.85, p < 0.0001] and that there was no difference in accuracy between the immediate
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and delayed encoding conditions [F(1, 117) = 0.46, p = 0.50]. By post-hoc t-test, collapsing
across delay groups, priming was highly significant for possible objects encoded immediately
before the test phase [M = 7.2%, t(119) = 6.83, p < 0.0001] and at a delay [M = 5.9%, t(119)
= 5.51, p < 0.0001].
For the older participants, the only significant effect was an interaction between object type
and encoding status [F(2, 156) = 6.02, p = 0.004]. Separate ANOVAs for possible and
impossible objects revealed an effect of encoding status for possible objects [F(2, 156) = 5.92,
p = 0.004], but not for impossible figures. Post-hoc helmert contrasts showed that encoded
possible objects were classified more accurately than new possible objects [F(1, 78) = 11.14,
p = 0.001] and that there was a trend for lower classification accuracies for possible objects
encoded at a delay compared to possible objects encoded immediately before the test [F(1, 78)
= 3.16, p = 0.08]. Post-hoc t-tests, collapsed across delay groups, indicated the presence of
reliable priming for possible objects presented in the immediate encoding block [M = 6.7%, t
(79) = 3.72, p < 0.001], but no priming for possible objects encoded at a delay [M = 2.7%, t
(79) = 1.53, p = 0.14].
To confirm this interaction between age and delay on priming for possible objects, we
conducted a follow-up ANOVA for possible objects with age group and encoding status as
factors (collapsing across delay group). Only the 20-min and 90-min delay groups were
included in this analysis, so that the same conditions were compared across age groups.
Interestingly, the expected age by encoding status interaction did not reach significance [F(2,
396) = 1.69, p = 0.19, η2G = 0.00133].
This inability to detect an interaction between age and encoding status likely derived from the
fact that the current analysis underestimated priming in young subjects because of ceiling
effects in performance, which make it difficult to detect a difference in the magnitude of
priming between the young and older groups. Therefore, we repeated the ANOVA for possible
objects, excluding all subjects whose classification accuracy for new possible objects was 90%
or higher (N = 28 young and 9 older subjects). This analysis revealed an interaction between
age group and encoding status [F(2, 302) = 3.41, p = 0.037, η2G = 0.0043]. By post-hoc t-test,
priming was significant for possible objects encoded immediately prior to the test block in
young [M = 10.2%, t(51) = 5.72, p < 0.0001) and older [M = 8.04%, t(70) = 4.16, p < 0.0001]
subjects, but only the young subjects demonstrated priming for possible objects encoded at a
delay [M = 8.7%, t(51) = 5.92, p < 0.0001]. In the older participants priming was significantly
reduced for objects encoded at a delay compared to objects encoded immediately prior to test
[t(70) = 2.01, p = 0.048] and no longer significant [M = 3.1%, t(70) = 1.58, p > 0.13].
To further explore the apparent decrease of priming over the delay in the older participants,
we examined whether this effect was dependent on subject’s baseline performance for new
objects. This analysis was motivated by the fact that although significantly longer stimulus
presentation times during the test phase were used for the older than the younger participants,
overall accuracy was still substantially lower for the group of older adults. Therefore, we split
the older subjects into two groups, based on their classification accuracy for new objects
(averaging across possible and impossible items). For the low-performing group (N=43),
classification accuracy for new items was 54.6%; for the high-performing group (N=37),
accuracy for new items was 75.7%. For all of the high-performing subjects, classification
accuracy for new items was significantly higher than chance at p < 0.05 (i.e., 65% or higher,
with chance being 50%), whereas none of the low-performing subjects differed from chance
at this threshold. By post-hoc t-test, accuracy for new possible and impossible objects was
significantly lower for the low-performing older subjects than for the high-performing older
individuals and than for young subjects [all p < 0.0001]. There was no difference between the
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high performing older subjects and young subjects for possible [t(115) = 0.85, p > 0.3] or
impossible [t(115) = 1.56, p = 0.12] objects.
Surprisingly, for the high-performing group, an ANOVA with object type, encoding status,
and delay group as factors showed no significant effects or interactions (all p > 0.12), indicating
that these subjects, although well capable of performing the possible/impossible object
discrimination, did not benefit from prior exposure to the objects. This lack of priming was
not due to ceiling effects for new objects, as exclusion of subjects whose classification accuracy
for new possible items was 90% or higher (N=7) did not affect the pattern of results.
In comparison, for the low-performing older group, there was a main effect of encoding status
[F(2, 82) = 4.44, p = 0.018] and an interaction between encoding status and object type [F(2,
82) = 5.88, p = 0.005]. An ANOVA on impossible objects did not reveal any significant effects
[all p > 0.28], whereas an ANOVA on possible objects demonstrated an effect of encoding
status [F(2, 82) = 11.22, p < 0.0001]. Post-hoc t-tests demonstrated priming for possible objects
in the immediate [M = 11.8%, t(42) = 5.2, p < 0.0001], but not in the delayed encoding condition
[M = 4.3%, t(42) = 1.65, p = 0.15]. Furthermore, the decrease in priming in the delayed relative
to the immediate encoding condition was significant [t(42) = 2.83, p = 0.01]. See Figure 3 for
a comparison of priming effects for possible objects between the high and low performing
older subjects. The same pattern of results was found when a median split was performed based
on subjects’ overall classification accuracy (averaging across all conditions). Almost all young
subjects performed significantly better than chance at baseline and exclusion of low performing
young subjects did not affect the results. By post-hoc t-test (uncorrected), the only difference
between the low and high performing older subjects was that the low performing group had
slightly lower DRS-scores than the high performing group (M = 138.0 vs. M = 139.8, t(78) =
2.05, p = 0.044; all other p > 0.12)1.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrate for the first time that perceptual priming for pre-
experimentally unfamiliar 3D objects remains stable for at least 1 week in young adults. In
healthy older adults, by comparison, priming for novel 3D objects was present only for objects
that were encoded immediately prior to the test phase, but not for objects encoded 20 min or
more before the test. Moreover, priming in the older group appeared to be limited to subjects
whose accuracy in the task was near chance levels. Older individuals who performed the task
at above chance levels did not show priming at any of the encoding-to-test delays. Taken
together, these results provide evidence for an apparently profound age-related deficit in
perceptual priming for novel 3D objects.
The present results are consistent with those reported by Schacter et al. (1992) who also
reported normal priming for possible objects in older adults whose baseline classification
accuracy was near chance levels when there was no encoding-to-test delay. As pointed out by
Schacter et al. (1992), the presence of chance-level performance at baseline raises the
possibility that the low-performing older subject may have performed the object decision task
differently than the young subjects and the high performing older individuals. The current
results provide support for this notion because the high performing older subjects evidenced a
differential pattern of priming than the low performing older participants.
1We also analyzed the data in terms of the signal detection theory measures of bias (CL) and sensitivity (dL), which are conflated in an
accuracy analysis. Both dL and CL are based on logistic distributions and are functionally equivalent to d' and β (Snodgrass & Corwin,
1988). For the high performing older subjects, there were no effects of encoding status on either bias or sensitivity [all p > 0.13]. By
comparison, for the low performing older group, both bias and sensitivity were greater for objects encoded immediately before the test
than for new objects [both p < 0.005], and there was no difference between objects in the delayed encoding condition relative to new
objects [both p > 0.07].
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One possibility that was also discussed by Schacter et al. (1992) is that the low performing
older individuals responded on the basis of stimulus familiarity rather than on the basis of the
structural information they were able to gather from test objects. Specifically, being unable to
differentiate between the two types of objects, subjects may have judged objects as being
possible when they were familiar (due to the prior exposure) because in the real world, all
familiar objects are structurally possible. The reason why a similar increase in possible
responses was not observed for previously presented impossible objects could be due to the
fact that stimulus familiarity (as measured by old/new recognition memory) tends to be lower
for impossible than possible figures (Schacter et al., 1990; Schacter et al., 1992). Thus, the
level of familiarity for previously encountered impossible objects may have been too low to
elicit a ‘possible’ response. This speculative explanation would also imply that the reason why
priming for possible objects in the low performing older group decreased over time is that
familiarity for these objects declined over time to a level that was too low to influence subjects’
responses.
The lack of priming in the high performing older participants suggests that these subjects have
a deficit in the ability to form or maintain new implicit perceptual representations of previously
unfamiliar 3-D objects. If so, this deficit would be expected to generalize to other perceptual
priming tasks using similar stimuli. The aim of Experiment 2 was to test this prediction.
Experiment 2: symmetric/asymmetric object-decision priming
The design of Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 1, except that the test task
was changed from one requiring a possible/impossible judgment to one requiring a symmetric/
asymmetric judgment. In addition, the 1-week delay condition was eliminated. The stimuli
consisted of depth-cued structurally possible objects (See Figure 4 for examples). Depth-cued
rather than line drawn figures were used because the 3-D structure of these stimuli might be
perceived more fluidly by the older subjects. Particular care was taken in pilot studies to choose
stimuli that would produce similar above-chance performance in both age groups.
Using line-drawn 3-D objects, Liu and Cooper (2001) previously showed that priming in the
symmetric/asymmetric object-decision test only occur for symmetric objects, even though both
symmetric and asymmetric possible objects show priming in the possible/impossible object-
decision task (for an explanation, see Liu & Cooper, 2001). Therefore, we predicted that
priming would only occur for symmetric objects in Experiment 2. The following two
hypotheses were tested: First, priming in young subjects is invariant with respect to the effects
of delay. Second, older subjects do not show priming at any of the encoding-to-test delays.
Method
Participants—Sixty-four young and 64 older adults participated in this experiment (Table
2). Half of them were randomly assigned to the 20-min delay condition, half to the 90-min
delay condition. An additional 8 older subjects and 2 young subjects were excluded from data
analysis because both their baseline test performance for new items and overall performance
across all test items did not differ from chance (<60% correct).
Stimuli and Procedure—A total 48 symmetric and 48 asymmetric objects were used in this
experiment. All of these depth-cued objects were based on the type of line-drawn possible
objects used in Experiment 1. The symmetric objects were symmetric about one or more planes,
whereas the asymmetric objects did not have any planes of symmetry. The procedure was
identical to that used in Experiment 1, except that subjects performed the symmetric/
asymmetric decision at test.
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Figure 5 shows the mean object-decision accuracy for young and older subjects. A preliminary
ANOVA on new items was conducted to test if baseline performance differed across age and
delay groups, with object type, age group and delay group (20 min vs. 90 min) as between
subject factors. There was a significant interaction between object type and age group [F(1,
124) = 5.55, p = 0.02], indicating that performance for asymmetric objects was slightly higher
in the young than in the older subjects [M (young) = 83.6; M (old) = 78.3; t(126) = 2.46, p =
0.015], whereas performance for symmetric objects did not differ across age groups [M (young)
= 66.2; M (old) = 69.7; t(126) = 1.51, p = 0.13]. However, this age difference for new
asymmetric objects is not problematic because neither young nor older subjects showed
priming for these stimuli, as expected (see below). There were no effects involving delay group
on baseline accuracy [all p > 0.14].
For young subjects, classification accuracy was higher for asymmetric than symmetric objects
[F(1, 62) = 19.35, p < 0.0001]. There was also an effect of encoding status [F(2, 124) = 6.88,
p = 0.0017], an interaction between encoding status and object type [F(2, 124) = 13.13, p <
0.0001], and an interaction between encoding status, object type, and delay condition [F(2,
124) = 4.57, p = 0.014). Separate ANOVAs for symmetric and asymmetric objects revealed
no reliable effects or interactions for asymmetric objects [all p > 0.13]. For symmetric objects,
there was an effect of encoding status [F(2, 124) = 17.22, p < 0.0001] and an interaction between
encoding status and delay condition [F(2, 124) = 3.09, p = 0.049]. Post-hoc contrasts showed
that symmetric objects presented in the immediate [F(1, 62) = 25.32, p < 0.0001] or delayed
[F(1, 62) = 25.83, p < 0.0001] encoding condition were classified more accurately than new
symmetric objects. However, for items in the immediate encoding phase, there was also an
interaction with delay condition [F(1, 62) = 5.30, p = 0.025], reflecting more priming for
subjects in the 90 min than in the 20 min delay group. There was no interaction with delay
group for items in the delayed encoding condition [F < 1]. Significant priming occurred for
previously presented symmetric objects in all conditions, as assessed via post-hoc t-test [all
p < 0.005, except for items in the immediate condition of the 20-min delay group where t(31)
= 1.99, p = 0.056].
The older adults also classified asymmetric objects more accurately than symmetric objects
[F(1, 62) = 4.53, p = 0.037]. None of the other effects or interactions were significant, indicating
the absence of priming in this group [all p > 0.14]. To confirm the effect of age on priming for
symmetric objects, we performed an ANOVA on classification accuracies for symmetric
objects, with age group, delay group, and encoding status as factors. There was an effect of
encoding status that was qualified by an interaction with age [F(2, 250) = 4.42, p = 0.01, η2G
= 0.013]. Post-hoc contrasts provided evidence for an interaction between encoding status and
age group for items in both the immediate [F(1, 125) = 7.29, p = 0.008, η2G = 0.055] and the
delayed [F(1, 125) = 6.13, p = 0.015, η2G = 0.047] encoding condition2. Unlike in Experiment
1, the dependence of priming on baseline performance was not examined further because
classification accuracy for new objects was significantly higher than chance (at p < 0.05, M =
65%) for almost all subjects (only 4 old and 6 young subjects scored between 60% and 64%
correct).
2As in Experiment 1, there were no effects or interactions involving encoding status on bias or sensitivity scores in the older group [all
p > 0.18], providing further evidence that priming did not occur in these subjects. In the young adults, by comparison, there was an effect
of encoding status on both sensitivity [F(2, 124) = 5.53, p = 0.005] and bias [F(2, 124) = 7.84, p = 0.0008]. Post-hoc contrasts indicated
increases in sensitivity and bias for items in the immediate and delayed conditions relative to new items [all p < 0.02].
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Experiment 2 showed that perceptual priming for novel objects in the symmetric/asymmetric
object-decision test was stable over a 90-min period in young adults. These results extend the
findings from Experiment 1 and suggest that a single exposure to an unfamiliar 3-D object is
sufficient for young adults to be able to form relatively long-lasting perceptual representations
of these stimuli. In stark contrast, the older adults did not show priming in this task at any of
the encoding-to-test delays. Taken together with the results from Experiment 1, this indicates
that perceptual priming for unfamiliar objects in block-based priming paradigms is impaired
as a result of normal aging. The main goal of Experiment 3 was to further evaluate the idea
that preserved priming of visual objects in older adulthood is dependent on pre-existing
memory representations by directly compared priming for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli.
Experiment 3: Real/non-real object-decision priming
The design of Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First,
the test task required subjects to classify objects as either real or non-real. Second, the test
stimuli were displayed until subjects made a response, allowing us to use RT as the primary
dependent variable. The reason for this change in task administration was two-fold. With the
same short display durations used in the previous experiments, accuracy in the young
participants was too close to ceiling to observe further increases in accuracy (i.e., priming).
Also, it allowed us to test if age differences in priming for unfamiliar stimuli can be observed
with RT-paradigms in which age differences tend to be smaller (Light et al., 2000). Both young
and older subjects were tested for stimuli they viewed immediately before the test phase and
for stimuli that occurred at a 20-min, 90-min, or 1-week delay. We predicted that older subjects
show similar levels of priming for the familiar stimuli as young adults at all encoding-to-test
delays, but reduced priming for the unfamiliar stimuli.
Method
Participants—96 young and 120 older adults participated in this experiment (Table 3). One
young and one older subject were excluded from analysis due to a procedural error. Thus, there
were 39 old and 31 young subjects in the 20-min delay condition and 40 old and 32 young
subjects each in the 90 and 1-week delay conditions.
Stimuli—The stimuli consisted of 48 real-world familiar objects from the Snodgrass and
Vanderwart (1980) stimulus set and 48 non-real unfamiliar objects. The non-real objects were
constructed from smoothly connected features of real Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) figures
(Figure 6). None of the real objects shared any features with the non-real objects (i.e., there
were two non-overlapping sets of objects). Non-real stimuli were used rather than line-drawn
possible objects so that subjects could not use low-level visual features (such as the presence
of curved lines) to differentiate between the familiar and unfamiliar items.
Procedure—The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that the test task required
a real/non-real object-decision. Test stimuli remained on the screen until subjects made a
response.
Results
Mean classification accuracy [M (young) = 97.48; M (old) = 97.41] and baseline classification
accuracy for both young and older subjects were at ceiling and did not differ between age
groups [both t < 1]. Therefore, RT was used as the dependent variable. In order to control the
effect of outliers on RT, upper and lower RT fences (Tukey, 1977) were computed as three
times the value of the interquartile range (as set for each subject by condition cell). Values
outside the fences (1.41% of the data) were recoded to the appropriate fence values. The
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resulting RT data was analyzed for correct trials only. Mean RTs for young and older subjects
are shown in Figure 7.
For young subjects, a repeated-measures ANOVA with object type, encoding status, and delay
group as factors showed faster RTs to real than to non-real objects [F(1, 92) = 26.96, p <
0.0001]. The effect of encoding status was also significant [F(2, 184) = 16.23, p < 0.0001], but
there were no effects of delay group [all p > 0.5]. Post-hoc t-tests, collapsing across delay
groups, indicated that RTs to previously presented real objects were significantly faster than
to new real objects in both the immediate [t(94) = 3.98, p < 0.0005] and the delayed encoding
conditions [t(94) = 3.63, p < 0.001], which did not differ from one another [t < 1]. For non-
real objects, priming was significant in the immediate condition [t(94) = 3.38, p < 0.005] but
only marginally significant in the delayed condition [t(94) = 1.73, p = 0.087 uncorrected]. The
reduction in priming for non-real objects in the delayed relative to the immediate condition
approached significance [t(94) = 1.91, p = 0.06 uncorrected].
The older subjects also classified real objects faster than non-real objects [F(1,116) = 72.96,
p < 0.0001], showed a main effect of encoding status [F(2, 234) = 5.05, p = 0.008], and an
interaction between encoding status and object type [F(2, 234) = 4.24, p = 0.017]. There were
no effects involving delay group [all p > 0.3]. By post-hoc t-test, collapsing across delay groups,
priming was significant for real objects in the immediate [t(118) = 6.05, p < 0.0001] and delayed
[t(118) = 5.82, p < 0.0001] encoding conditions. There was no priming for non-real objects in
either the immediate [t(118) = 0.19, p = 0.85] or delayed [t(118) = 0.07, p = 0.94] conditions.
To evaluate the effect of aging on priming, proportional priming scores (i.e., percentage
decrease in RT for encoded relative to new objects) were computed because of the large
difference in baseline RT between young and older subjects [M (young) = 763 ms; M (old) =
1346 ms; p < 0.0001]. An ANOVA (collapsing across delay groups) with age group, delay
condition (immediate vs. delayed), and object type as factors revealed more proportional
priming for real than non-real objects [F(1,212) = 25.76, p < 0.0001], and a marginal interaction
between object type and age group [F(1, 212) = 3.28, p = 0.07, η2G = 0.005]. Follow-up
ANOVAs showed that there were no effects of age or delay on proportional priming of real
objects [all p > 0.4]. For non-real objects, however, there was a main effect of age group [F
(1, 212) = 5.03, p = 0.026, η2G = 0.0153], indicating less priming in the older than the young
subjects.
Discussion
As predicted and consistent with previous research, Experiment 3 showed that priming for
familiar objects is age invariant, even at encoding-to-test delays of up to 1 week. However, as
in Experiments 1 and 2, only the young participants demonstrated priming for the unfamiliar
stimuli. These results extent the findings from Experiments 1 and 2 by showing that the age-
related decrease in priming for unfamiliar visual objects generalizes to a third class of stimuli
– globally unfamiliar objects with familiar parts – and to another task – real/non-real object-
decision priming. They further indicate that the presence of familiar object parts is not sufficient
to support priming in older adults. The results from Experiment 3 also indicate that the age-
related reduction in priming is not specific to object-decision tasks that require a purely
perceptual judgment on the objects, because the real/non-real task requires subjects to access
pre-existing semantic representations to decide if an object is in fact real. Finally, Experiment
3 extends the finding of an age-related reduction in priming for unfamiliar visual objects from
accuracy paradigms to a RT paradigm. This latter finding is of significance because it has been
argued that age-related decreases in priming are more prevalent in accuracy than in RT
paradigms (Light et al., 2000).
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An interesting and unexpected finding from Experiment 3 is that priming for the non-real
objects decreased in the young adults when as little as 20 min intervened between the encoding
and test phases of the experiments. This stands on contrast to the observed preservation of
priming for unfamiliar objects over delays in the possible/impossible and symmetric/
asymmetric tasks. A potential explanation for this finding is that priming for the non-real
objects was at least partially mediated by parts-based structural, lexical, or semantic
representations, which decay more quickly over time (Biederman & Cooper, 1991). Priming
for the possible objects used in Experiments 1 and 2 was likely mediated by global structural
representations (Schacter et al., 1990), which appear to be more resistant to the effects of decay
or interference.
General Discussion
In a recent review article, Fleischman (2007) concluded in that “a mild reduction in priming
is not part and parcel of healthy aging”, but may be an early indicator for neurological disease.
While this may be true for tasks using familiar stimuli, the present findings indicate that at least
some forms of priming of unfamiliar visual objects are reduced in healthy older adults. Across
three different block-based tasks and stimulus sets, young but not older adults showed priming
for unfamiliar visual objects. As such, the present results point to the significance of pre-
existing representations in supporting priming in later adulthood.
At first sight, the finding of an age-related reduction in priming for unfamiliar stimuli appears
to conflict with the results by Soldan et al. (2008) who reported normal short-term priming in
older adults in a continuous version of the possible/impossible object-decision test. However,
the implementation of the possible/impossible object-decision test used by Soldan et al.
(2008) differed from the implementation used in the current study in a number of ways that
are likely to account for the differential pattern of results.
First and foremost, the number of stimuli intervening between stimulus repetitions was
significantly lower in the study by Soldan et al. (2008) (i.e., 2, 4, or 6 intervening items)
compared to an average of 70 items (including buffer stimuli) in the present study for stimuli
in the immediate condition. One possibility, therefore, is that older adults are able to form novel
representations of unfamiliar objects to support priming over short delays (in the order of
seconds), but that these representations degrade relatively quickly over time due to the effects
of decay and/or interference and are too weak to support priming over longer delays (several
minutes) and many intervening stimuli. Support for this possibility comes from preliminary
data in our laboratory showing that in older adults, the magnitude of priming for possible
objects in the short-term paradigm decreased as a function of the number of intervening items
whereas in young subjects it remained constant (Hilton, Pavlicic, & Stern, unpublished
manuscript).
A second difference between the present study and that by Soldan et al. (2008) is that subjects
performed the same task on repeated stimuli in the study by Soldan et al. (2008), whereas a
different task was performed during the encoding and test phases of the present study. This
difference is potentially important because different processes and brain regions may support
priming in both cases. When the same task is performed on repeated stimuli, the resulting
priming effects have been proposed to largely reflect the learning of highly specific stimulus-
decision or stimulus-response associations (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & Schacter, 2004).
This type of priming has been associated with activity reductions in prefrontal cortical regions
in young adults, older adults, and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Lustig & Buckner,
2004). Perceptual priming effects that are observed when different tasks are performed on
repeated stimuli, in comparison, must be based on the learning of stimulus-specific information
that exists independent of a specific response or decision. This type of priming may be more
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reliant on posterior cortical regions that represent the perceptual properties of the stimuli
(Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007). It is possible therefore that the age-related reduction in
priming observed in this study not only reflects a reduced ability to maintain priming over time
and intervening stimuli, but also a deficit in the learning of task-independent novel perceptual
information, particularly the 3-D structure of visual objects.
This view is supported by studies showing that older adults are impaired at drawing 3-D cubes
and in recognizing whether line drawings accurately depict 3D cubes, but show no impairment
for 2-D patterns (Plude, Milberg, & Cerella, 1986). Aging has also been associated with
somewhat poorer recognition of line drawings of 3-D objects from 2-D views, i.e., orthographic
depictions (Salthouse, 1991) and a reduced ability to discriminate 3-D shape from motion
parallax (Norman, Clayton, Shular, & Thompson, 2004) and from static and dynamic patterns
of binocular disparity (Norman et al., 2006). These visual-spatial age-related deficits in 3-D
perception may be related not only to the reduction in priming observed in the present study
but also to older adults’ overall greater difficulty in task performance, particularly in the
possible/impossible object-decision test. In particular, it is possible that the system for
perceiving and encoding 3-D form is so impaired in the low-performing subjects that it could
not support adequate task performance and the measured priming effect did not reflect
facilitation in 3-D structural processing, but a different kind of memory process. In the high-
performing group, these perceptual processes might be intact enough to support relatively
normal task performance, but too impaired to support priming.
A third difference between Experiment 1 of the current study and that by Soldan et al.
(2008) is the type of dependent variable used to measure priming (accuracy vs. reaction time).
This difference, however, is unlikely to account for the differential pattern of results across
studies because the results from Experiment 3 indicated that the age related-deficit in priming
for unfamiliar stimuli extended to RT paradigms.
Finally, the possibility of explicit memory contamination needs to be considered. To the extent
that priming in the tasks used here is influenced by explicit memory, the age-related reduction
in priming might reflect decreased explicit memory that accompanies normal aging, rather than
an age-related reduction in implicit memory. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out,
several findings argue against it. First, as described in the introduction, priming in the possible/
impossible object-decision test can be dissociated from explicit memory in a number of ways.
Second, if explicit memory influenced priming in the possible/impossible object-decision test,
one would expect this influence to be the same or greater in the high performing older adults
as in the low performing older subjects. This is turn should produce the same or more priming
in the high than in the low performing older adults, which was not the case. For the symmetric/
asymmetric task, the relation between priming and explicit memory has not been examined
previously, which indicates caution in interpreting the results. However, the finding that
priming in the young participants only occurred for symmetric objects again suggests that
explicit memory is unlikely to have influenced performance. Even if explicit memory were
significantly lower for asymmetric than symmetric objects, one would expect at least a small
influence of explicit memory on task performance for asymmetric objects in the young subjects
(i.e., a trend towards priming), which was not evident. Finally, for the real/non-real task, the
finding that priming did not decrease over the 1-week period is also inconsistent with an
influence of explicit memory on task performance because explicit memory is known to
decrease over time. In addition, unless the young group reached asymptotic levels of reaction
time, the magnitude of proportional priming for real objects would be expected to be greater
in the young than the older participants, because of their greater level of explicit memory. The
data, however, showed no age difference in proportional priming for real objects.
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In conclusion, the present results provide evidence for an age-related reduction in priming for
unfamiliar visual objects in block-based tasks that require the maintenance of priming over
many intervening stimuli and changes in task from encoding to test. This finding supports the
view that when older adults cannot rely on pre-existing memory representations, age-related
deficits in priming can emerge.
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Examples of structurally possible and impossible figures used in Experiment 1.
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Results from Experiment 1. Mean classification accuracy in the possible/impossible object-
decision test for young (left panel) and older (right panel) adults for new objects (  new),
objects encoded immediately before the test phase (  Imm), and objects encoded at a delay
(  top panel: 20 min, middle panel: 90 min, bottom panel: 1 week). Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean. Young subjects showed significant priming for possible objects at
all encoding-to-test delays. In older subjects, priming was reliable in the immediate, but not in
the delayed encoding condition.
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Results from Experiment 1. Mean classification accuracy in high and low performing older
subjects for new possible objects ( ), possible objects encoded immediately before the test
phase ( ), and possible objects encoded at a delay (  collapsing across the 20 min and 90 min
groups). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. The high performing older subjects
did not show priming, whereas the low-performing older subjects showed priming in the
immediate condition but not in the delayed condition. See text for more details.
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Examples of the depth-cued symmetric and asymmetric objects used in Experiment 2.
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Results from Experiment 2. Mean classification accuracy in the symmetric/asymmetric object-
decision test for young (left panel) and older (right panel) adults for new objects (  new),
objects encoded immediately before the test phase (  Imm), and objects encoded at a delay
(  top panel: 20 min, bottom panel: 90 min). Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean. Young subjects showed significant priming for symmetric objects at all encoding-to-
test delays. In the older subjects, no significant priming was observed.
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Examples of the familiar, real objects and the unfamiliar, non-real objects used in Experiment
3.
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Results from Experiment 3. Mean classification accuracy in the real/non-real object-decision
test for young (left panel) and older (right panel) adults for new objects (  new), objects
encoded immediately before the test phase (  Imm), and objects encoded at a delay (  top
panel: 20 min, middle panel: 90 min, and bottom panel: 1 week). Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean. Young and older subjects showed priming for the familiar objects
at all encoding-to-test delays. Only the young subjects demonstrated priming of the unfamiliar
objects.
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Table 1
Demographic and neuropsychological variables for subjects in Experiment 1
Young Old
(n = 120) (n = 80)
Female/Male 71/49 50/30
Age * 21.1 (3.4) 73.8 (6.1)
Education (yr) 14.3 (2.9) 14.3 (1.9)
DRS-2 * 141.4 (2.3) 138.8 (3.9)
NART-IQ* 115.2 (5.6) 119.7 (6.9)
SRT total recall* 59.8 (5.2) 44.1 (9.2)
WAIS letter-number sequencing * 13.3 (3.1) 9.6 (2.4)
Verbal fluency- CFL 48.2 (10.6) 46.6 (14.0)
Note: means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for demographic variables and neuropsychological test scores. DRS-2, Dementia Rating Scale-2;
NART-IQ, North American Adult Reading Test estimated IQ; SRT, Selective Reminding Test; WAIS, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
*
Significant difference between groups, p < 0.001.
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Table 2
Demographic and neuropsychological variables for subjects in Experiment 2
Young Old
(n = 64) (n = 64)
Female/Male 41/23 41/23
Age * 21.0 (3.5) 71.6 (4.8)
Education (yr) 14.1 (2.2) 14.7 (2.9)
DRS-2 * 141.7 (2.0) 138.4 (3.1)
NART-IQ 117.6 (6.3) 115.0 (10.3)
SRT total recall* 61.8 (4.8) 46.7 (8.6)
WAIS letter-number sequencing * 13.5 (2.7) 9.0 (2.3)
Verbal fluency- CFL* 47.6 (10.3) 40.7 (13.3)
Note: means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for demographic variables and neuropsychological test scores. DRS-2, Dementia Rating Scale-2;
NART-IQ, North American Adult Reading Test estimated IQ; SRT, Selective Reminding Test; WAIS, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
*
Significant difference between groups, p < 0.001.
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Table 3
Demographic and neuropsychological variables for subjects in Experiment 3
Young Old
(n = 95) (n = 119)
Female/Male 59/36 77/42
Age * 20.8 (2.8) 72.5 (5.5)
Education (yr) 14.0 (1.9) 14.4 (2.5)
DRS-2 * 141.0 (2.2) 139.5 (2.9)
NART-IQ 115.9 (5.8) 117.7 (7.2)
SRT total recall* 58.6 (6.3) 47.4 (8.6)
WAIS letter-number sequencing * 12.8 (2.5) 9.7 (2.4)
Verbal fluency- CFL* 48.9 (10.9) 43.5 (13.2)
Note: means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for demographic variables and neuropsychological test scores. DRS-2, Dementia Rating Scale-2;
NART-IQ, North American Adult Reading Test estimated IQ; SRT, Selective Reminding Test; WAIS, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.
*
Significant difference between groups, p < 0.001.
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